Red Sun Setting Read online

  Red Sun Setting

  Red Sun

  Setting

  THE BATTLE OF THE

  PHILIPPINE SEA

  By William T. Y’Blood

  BLUEJACKET BOOKS

  Naval Institute Press

  Annapolis, Maryland

  This book has been brought to publication by the generous assistance of Marguerite and Gerry Lenfest.

  Naval Institute Press

  291 Wood Road

  Annapolis, MD 21402

  © 1981 by the United States Naval Institute

  All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

  First Bluejacket Books printing, 2003

  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

  Y’Blood, William T., 1937–

  Red sun setting : the Battle of the Philippine Sea / by William T. Y’Blood.—1st Bluejacket books print.

  p. cm. — (Bluejacket books)

  Includes bibliographical references and index.

  ISBN 978-1-6125-1197-9

  1. Philippine Sea, Battle of the, 1944. 2. World War, 1939-1945—Naval operations, American. 3. World War, 1939-1945— Naval operations, Japanese. I. Title. II. Series.

  D744.P5 Y37 2003

  940.54’25—dc21

  2002041062

  Contents

  Preface

  Glossary

  Introduction

  chapter 1A Long Winding Road

  chapter 2Operation A-GO

  chapter 3Operation Forager

  chapter 4“The Rise and Fall of Imperial Japan Depends on This One Battle”

  chapter 5“Like an Old Time Turkey Shoot”

  chapter 6Attack into the Setting Sun

  chapter 7Chaos over the Task Force

  chapter 8Frustrating Victory

  appendix IUnited States Units Engaged in the Battle of the Philippine Sea

  appendix IIJapanese Units Engaged in Operation A-GO, 1-20 June 1944

  appendix IIIU.S. Air Operations on 19 June

  I—Interceptions

  II—Bombing Missions

  III—Search and Rescue Missions

  appendix IVU.S. Air Operations on 20 June: The Attack on the Mobile Fleet

  Notes

  Bibliography

  Index

  Preface

  SURPRISINGLY, the Battle of the Philippine Sea has been somewhat neglected in the annals of history. Certainly, it is mentioned in books on World War II, but there is no truly comprehensive account of this action—the greatest carrier duel of the war. It is hoped this book will begin to rectify this omission.

  This is not a study of the battle from the lofty perch of the strategic planners. Rather, this is the story of the battle from the viewpoint of the admirals, sailors, fliers, and ship’s officers who were on the firing line, with a glance at the strategy and planning that led to this huge confrontation. It is also the story of the controversy that erupted after the battle, a controversy that still simmers today.

  A work of this type is never the work of just one person; it is based on the experiences of hundreds or thousands of individuals. A look at the bibliography will show just how indebted I am to these individuals, especially to the largely unknown authors of the Action Reports and War Diaries.

  In particular, however, I am indebted to the following: Dr. Dean C. Allard and his assistants, primarily Mrs. Gerri Judkins, at the Operational Archives Branch of the Naval Historical Center in Washington, for their patience and expertise in guiding me through the maze of records there; Mr. John W. Taylor at the Modern Military Records section of the National Archives; the staffs of the photographic libraries of the National Archives and the United States Naval Institute for their help in finding the photographs to go into this book; Dr. Paul S. Dull for his valuable comments on the manuscript; the Air Micronesia pilots who took the time during my visit to those islands to acquaint me with that special experience that is Micronesia; finally, but certainly not last, I would like to thank three very important people in my life—my wife, Carolyn, and my son and daughter, Kent and Laura. All three provided help, encouragement, and inspiration when I needed it.

  NOTE: In this book the Japanese names are rendered in English order.

  Glossary

  AA

  Antiaircraft fire

  AP

  Armor-piercing shell or bomb

  ASP

  Antisubmarine patrol

  BatDiv

  Battleship Division

  BB

  Battleship

  Bogey(s)

  Unidentified aircraft

  CA

  Heavy cruiser

  CAP

  Combat air patrol

  CarDiv

  Carrier Division

  CCS

  Combined Chiefs of Staff

  CinCPac

  Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet

  CL

  Light cruiser

  CL(AA)

  Antiaircraft light cruiser

  C.O.

  Commanding Officer

  CruDiv

  Cruiser Division

  CV

  Aircraft carrier

  CVE

  Escort carrier

  CVL

  Light carrier

  DD

  Destroyer

  DE

  Destroyer escort

  DesDiv

  Destroyer Division

  DesRon

  Destroyer Squadron

  FDO

  Fighter director officer

  Flak

  Antiaircraft fire

  GP

  General-purpose bomb

  Hedgehog

  Type of throw-ahead missile launcher

  HF/DF

  High frequency direction finding

  IFF

  Identification, friend or foe

  JCS

  Joint Chiefs of Staff

  Jink(ing)

  To take evasive action in an aircraft

  LCI(G)

  Landing craft, infantry (gunboat)

  LSO

  Landing signal officer

  LST

  Landing ship, tank

  Magic

  Code name of project to decipher Japanese codes

  OTC

  Officer in tactical command

  SAP

  Semi-armor-piercing shell or bomb

  TF

  Task Force

  TG

  Task Group

  TU

  Task Unit

  USA

  United States Army

  USMC

  United States Marine Corps

  USN

  United States Navy

  USS

  United States Ship

  VB

  Navy bomber squadron or single plane

  VF

  Navy fighter squadron or single plane

  VSB

  Navy scout-bomber squadron or single plane

  VSO

  Navy scout-observation squadron or single plane

  VT

  Navy torpedo-bomber squadron or single plane

  XCV

  Japanese hybrid battleship/carrier; i.e. the Ise and the Hyuga

  Aircraft Types

  United States

  Avenger

  Grumman/General Motors TBF/TBM torpedo plane

  Corsair

  Vought F4U fighter

  Dauntless

  Douglas SBD dive bomber

  Hellcat

  Grumman F6F fighter

  Helldiver

  Curtiss SB2C dive bomber


  Kingfisher

  Vought OS2U float scout plane

  Liberator

  Consolidated B-24/PB4Y heavy bomber or patrol plane

  Mariner

  Martin PBM flying-boat

  Seagull

  Curtiss SOC float scout plane

  Wildcat

  Grumman/General Motors F4F/FM fighter

  Japanese

  Betty

  Mitsubishi G4M attack bomber

  Emily

  Kawanishi H8K flying-boat

  Frances

  Yokosuka P1Y night fighter

  Hamp

  Mitsubishi A6M3 fighter; later called Zeke 32

  Helen

  Nakajima Ki-49 heavy bomber

  Irving

  Nakajima J1N1 reconnaissance plane or night fighter

  Jack

  Mitsubishi J2M fighter

  Jake

  Aichi E13A reconnaisance floatplane

  Jill

  Nakajima B6N torpedo bomber

  Judy

  Yokosuka D4Y dive bomber

  Kate

  Nakajima B5N torpedo bomber

  Nick

  Kawasaki Ki-45 fighter

  Oscar

  Nakajima Ki-43 fighter

  Tojo

  Nakajima Ki-44 fighter

  Tony

  Kawasaki Ki-61 fighter

  Topsy

  Mitsubishi L4M/Ki-57 transport

  Val

  Aichi D3A dive bomber

  Zeke

  Mitsubishi A6M fighter

  Red Sun Setting

  Introduction

  BY JUNE OF 1944 the tide that had swept the Japanese forces across the Pacific to Wake, Guadalcanal, and New Guinea had begun to ebb rapidly. The Pacific War had begun impressively enough for the Japanese with a series of stunning victories at Pearl Harbor, Hong Kong, Singapore, in the Java Sea and the Indian Ocean, and in the Philippines. By these victories the Japanese had forced the U.S. Navy to rethink its strategic and tactical options. The battleship, beloved vessel of the “Big Gun” admirals, was pushed to one side and the aircraft carrier became the new capital ship. Unfortunately, United States carrier tactics were still very much in the formative stage. In a battleship-oriented navy, the tactics, administration, and other policies that make a carrier unit run efficiently were still being formulated when 7 December 1941 came. Then there was no time to go over procedures systematically; the carriers were sent out to fight. But by June 1944 the concepts, procedures, and policies had all fallen into place. Of this the Japanese Navy was only too aware.

  The awesome victories for the Japanese continued for some months, but then came Coral Sea, Midway, and the furious series of actions on and around Guadalcanal. Besides the precious carriers that were lost in some of these battles, the Japanese had lost irreplaceable flight crews. Their airmen had been the best trained in the Pacific during the early days of the war, but they had been small in numbers. The Japanese had planned on quick conquests, using a small elite group of fliers. They had not planned to augment this group with additional trained airmen at a later time. As a result, few qualified fliers were available to take up the slack caused by the losses in these crucial battles, and it would be some time before a training program would become effective. The need for experienced airmen would become all too apparent to the Japanese military leaders in the months ahead. Indeed, lower-ranking Japanese would not be the only ones to fall in combat. On 18 April 1943 Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s plane was ambushed by United States Army Air Force planes and the admiral was killed. As with Midway, this victory could be credited to the marvelous work of the American cryptanalysts.

  By the end of 1943 the Solomons campaign was almost over and strategic interest now switched to the Central Pacific. In November 1943 the Gilberts were taken by the Americans. Heavy losses were sustained by the Marines at Tarawa, but by this point in the war the Americans were beginning to digest the lessons they had been force-fed by the Japanese. On 6 January 1944 the Fast Carrier Task Force (initially built around a core of six fleet and five light carriers but constantly increasing in size) became Task Force 58 under the command of Rear Admiral Marc A. Mitscher.

  Task Force 58 began a series of attacks—the Marshalls, Truk, the Marianas, Palau, Hollandia—that kept the Japanese guessing and subtracted more aircraft and fliers from their order of battle. In May TF 58 was anchored at Majuro, in the Marshalls, for a well-earned rest. A big operation was just around the corner—Forager, the invasion of the Marianas. Not since the big fleet actions around Guadalcanal in 1942 had the Japanese sought a large-scale battle. Some Americans thought they never would. Others thought that with the right provocation the Japanese Navy would come out spoiling for a fight. It was hoped that Forager be the right provocation.

  chapter 1

  A Long Winding Road

  UNITED STATES STRATEGIC PLANNING for Pacific operations during World War II can be likened to a tortuous back road in the mountains. Along the winding road on the way to Tokyo were a number of stops and an occasional side road. One of these stops, in the Marianas, did supply the provocation for the Japanese Fleet to seek a naval action with the United States Fifth Fleet. However, the road to the Marianas engagement was not a smooth one, and for some time thought was given to taking a side road and bypassing these islands entirely.

  Even before the war, the Marianas had figured importantly in U.S. naval plans for the Pacific. In the event of a war with Japan the pre-World War II Orange and Rainbow plans called for U.S. forces to move across the Pacific via the Marshalls and the Marianas to the Philippines.1 It was assumed the latter islands would be under heavy attack or even lost. American forces would move through the Central Pacific to drive off the Japanese and relieve the Philippines.

  The Pearl Harbor attack and the stunning early victories of the Japanese in the Pacific threw out of balance these pre-war plans. The direction of the Japanese attacks also tended to color U.S. strategic planning in the first years of the war. With Japanese and United States forces fighting in the South and Southwest Pacific during this time, the attention of the U.S. strategists was drawn in that direction.2 Operations in the Central Pacific were limited to weak raids on widely scattered targets. Still, the “traditional Navy view of war against Japan in any case was that the major offensive would be across the Central Pacific rather than through the East Indies.”3

  Fortunately, the war plans issued were not cast in concrete. Circumstances changed and so plans changed. The operations against the Marianas showed just how flexible these plans could be.

  At the time of the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 “there was no final, approved plan in existence for the defeat of Japan.”4 In August of the previous year the Joint United States Strategic Committee had begun work on a strategic plan for the defeat of Japan, but this plan was far from finished when the American and British leaders met at Casablanca. Although nothing was yet in solid form, Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, undertook to present his views on the Pacific situation.

  King’s “ideas at this stage of the war closely followed the concept developed in the preceding years of war games at Newport and of successive plans named Orange.”5 An American advance, according to King, should be toward the Philippines—but by way of the Marshalls, Truk, and the Marianas, not via New Guinea and the Netherlands East Indies. These latter areas were not, in King’s view, the proper places for the use of American naval forces. King stressed the Marianas as “the key of the situation because of their location on the Japanese line of communications.”6

  So it was here at Casablanca that King described to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) “the line of advance through the Central Pacific to the Philippines that was in fact to be the primary strategic pattern for the war against Japan.”7 King was sure that America’s growing naval strength (which would see in 1943 a massive increase with the addition of the new Essex-class carriers and Iowa-class battleships)
would eventually force the Japanese into submission without the terrible losses which would be incurred in an invasion of Japan.8 It took many months of high-level wrangling before a Central Pacific route was approved, but King’s confidence in his naval forces was well founded. When the fast carriers showed they could operate without land-based air cover, deep in enemy territory, the Central Pacific drive moved more rapidly and deeply into the Japanese defenses.9

  It would take some time for King’s ideas to be digested by the Combined Chiefs. In the meantime, General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief Southwest Pacific, found King’s plans thoroughly indigestible and wasted no time in criticizing it. In his campaign plan for the Southwest Pacific, Reno I issued in February 1943, he claimed that the route King favored would be “time consuming and expensive in . . . naval power and shipping.”10 A drive up the back of New Guinea and into the Philippines (under his command, of course) would be more successful.

  MacArthur’s protests had little effect. In March 1943, representatives of the three major areas (South, Southwest, and Central) met in Washington for a Pacific Military Conference. Most of the agenda was taken up with operations in the South and Southwest Pacific and the endless debate over the division of resources between Europe and the Pacific. However, King and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz’s representative, Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, were able to put in a few words for a Central Pacific offensive. King pointed out indirectly that major Navy units could be more valuable in the Central Pacific than in the Solomons—New Guinea area. Spruance then pointed out that with Japanese naval forces still afloat, Pearl Harbor remained a tempting target. Ships from the South Pacific, along with the new vessels just becoming available, could launch an assault on the Gilberts and Marshalls, and remove the threat of an attack on Hawaii.11 (Left unsaid but very likely considered by King was the thought that a Gilberts or Marshalls operation would provide the opening for the Navy to push through to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) more reasons for a Central Pacific offensive.)